Critics of Cooperative Multilateralism. Those skeptical of the cooperative approach noted that it has at least four weaknesses. First, it may subordinate US national interests to the collective will of other nations, international institutions, or international agreements whose interests are often different from ours. Second, it constrains the ability of the United States to take forceful, direct action in defense of its interests at a time when its hard power is at its apex and remains vulnerable to external threats. We know from historical experience that international agreements, particularly in the arms control area, often empower rogue states and other international outlaws. Third, it conveys a potential image of complacency and weakness to foes that equate multilateral diplomacy with doubt and indecision. Fourth, it invites criticism from some Americans who are suspicious of remote, global institutions that for them portend a loss of national sovereignty.

How can the United States ensure its own national security while at the same time create a stable, just, and sustainable global system in the 21st century?

Where Do We Go From Here? Six Critical Issues Requiring Further Political Debate

To recap the goals and methods of the Independent Task Force on "Strategies for US National Security," the Stanley Foundation brought together roughly 25 participants from various professional, analytical, and ideological backgrounds to consider three macro-level questions about the future of US national security. The participants in question reflected both military and civilian backgrounds, and many of the independent experts in the group had direct or indirect connections to official circles in the military or the Washington, DC, policy community. The questions animating the group's discussions were:

- What should the United States do with its historically unprecedented global power?
- What is the likely future position of the United States in the world 10 to 15 years from now, and how should the United States go about influencing that position?
- How can the United States ensure its own national security while at the same time create a stable, just, and sustainable global system in the 21st century?

This concluding section describes in detail **six critical issues** around which there was a consistent lack of majority opinion and consensus, and that require further intensive debate and reflection:

- The timing and standards for military preemption and preventive war.

- The costs of global primacy and a US hegemonic order.

- The importance of incorporating (and seriously funding) national security initiatives that combat nontraditional and transnational threats through conflict prevention measures such as development aid to struggling societies and states.

- The necessity and feasibility of spreading liberal democracy as a conflict prevention measure that bolsters US security.

- The future of WMD arms control and disarmament.

- The importance of conventional weapons proliferation.

The ultimate answer to these questions will have a defining impact on US security in coming years and ideally should be fully confronted in the political debates surrounding the upcoming presidential election in 2004. Each of these critical areas of dispute will need to be resolved if the United States is to pursue a truly integrated, coherent, and effective set of international policies over the long term.

Preemption and Preventive War

The first area, which is the one that has received the most attention, is the emphasis on preemption (as opposed to deterrence and containment) as the key component of the NSS. In the strategy document and in his West Point speech, the president emphasized that we cannot let our enemies strike first. But some members of the task force accused the administration of failing to clarify in the strategy document exactly which enemies it has in mind. In their view, it is unclear whether a policy of preemption applies only to terrorists or also to the rogue states that harbor them. If it also applies to rogue regimes, they asked if the policy includes all outlaw states, only the "axis of evil" states, or just a particular member of the axis. Some are also confused about the criteria that will be used to decide whom and when to preempt. Finally, a few members expressed concern about recent press reports that speculated that preemption might even include a first strike with nuclear weapons against "hard targets."

The national security advisor sought to clear up some of this confusion in a speech to the Manhattan Institute in New York City on October 1, 2002. Among other things, she tried to make clear that the United

States is not proposing to abandon the traditional concept of deterrence. The strategy, in fact, explicitly endorses deterrence, stating flatly that the military must be able to deter threats against US interests, allies, and friends. She also sought to assure the administration's critics that the preemptive use of force would be applied in a careful and considered manner. Preemption, she said, would come only after all other means, including diplomacy, had been exhausted, and in response to a grave threat for which the dangers of waiting outweighed the risks of taking action.

Critics see the Bush strategy as ushering in a new age of American imperialism, for which the United States is ill-prepared either psychologically or financially.

Some members asked, however, if all this talk of preemption might undermine strategic stability in a crisis by providing potential foes like North Korea or Iran with incentives to lash out at the United States first rather than wait for a debilitating first strike. They speculated that preemption might undermine deterrence by encouraging countries to adopt precarious "launch-on-warning" force postures and undertake a "race to the button" in a crisis, thereby potentially unleashing their weapons systems in advance of what they believe might be a destructive preemptive US strike against them.

Moreover, if the United States reserves the right to preempt when it believes that its enemies are poised to strike against it, one of our group asked what is to prevent India from employing the same doctrine to justify a preemptive strike against Pakistan, or China against Taiwan, or Russia against Georgia. Some members pointed out that high-level Indian and Russian leaders have already made statements approving of the value of "anticipatory self-defense" after the release of the NSS. Their concern, which is noted but dismissed in the NSS, is that other countries could adopt similar defensive strategies as pretexts for aggression.

More broadly, the preemption doctrine elicits concern in foreign capitals and in the halls of international organizations that the foreign policy of this nation has undergone a radical revision in the aftermath of 9/11. US allies and partners fear that this doctrinal innovation signals the birth of a new era in which an enraged America is intent on revising the international status quo to its own liking. They have expressed the fear that the United States has given itself a green light to use its overwhelmingly vast conventional military hastily against recalcitrant nations so as to remake them in America's own image. In short, critics see this strategy as ushering in a new age of American imperialism, for which the United States is ill-prepared either psychologically or financially.

The Costs of Global Primacy and a US Hegemonic Order
Can the United States afford a strategy of military primacy? Can it afford to have such a massive force that regional powers such as Russia or China are dissuaded from pursuing significant military power for projecting their interests on a regional basis? Will a national security strategy based upon US unilateral dominance undermine US authority on key issues with other states, thereby subverting law enforcement and intelligence cooperation in the war against terrorism? Or will it alienate nations whose assistance will be needed to address global environmental decline, spreading pandemics, transnational crime, and other nontraditional but critical threats to US security?

There was no widespread consensus that a US policy focused on indefinite hegemony would eventually subvert the US leadership role. One task force member even pointed out that global primacy was a simple *fact*, not a strategy to be created, since the United States has reached its current dominant position spending only 3-4 percent of its GDP and proceeding with its normal Cold War deployment patterns.

However, this fact still begged an important question: What should US primacy look like on the world stage so that it might be generally seen as *legitimate* by other nations and cultures? Should it be centered on rule-based institutions or on discrete US reactions in the form of ad hoc coalitions created for each crisis? Which approach is truly sustainable and most likely to enhance US security in the long run?

Those concerned with the costs of global primacy stressed the dangers of losing financial, political, logistical, and military support in key regions during future crises, including multilateral support for nation-building in failed or failing states such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or Liberia. In particular, some task force members also expressed concern that the pursuit of primacy by the United States would alienate those foreign countries whose assistance will be needed to address global environmental decline, spreading epidemics, transnational crime, and other nontraditional security threats. Several task force members stressed the need to create a new “rule-based order” or “institutional order” in key regions such as East and Southeast Asia or the need to re-create a Great Power consensus on a revamped United Nations in order to lower the costs of the US leadership role and gain critical support from major regional powers such as China, Russia, or the European Union.

International Coalitions: Institutional or Ad Hoc? One major issue requiring more clarity is the role of existing alliances vis-à-vis what the

administration calls “coalitions of the willing,” or ad hoc coalitions. The NSS notes that the United States is committed to supporting longstanding institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO. But the NSS also calls for creating coalitions of the willing, as we did in the war against Iraq, to deal with specific threats. The first statement suggests a willingness to consult with our traditional allies and partners, while the latter implies that this country alone determines the mission in any given circumstance and others can hop aboard if they wish—but whether they do so or not is largely irrelevant to us.

A critique of the version of global primacy espoused by the Bush NSS was the heavy focus on reacting to threats, as opposed to creating new structures and acting on opportunities for positive change.

If the United States systematically chooses to bypass established organizations such as the United Nations in favor of ad hoc coalitions, then it risks their increasing obsolescence in the face of today’s new challenges. By the same token, these traditional institutions may constrain US power and frustrate the pursuit of our national interests amid interminable consultations with those whose express purpose it is to render less significant the US advantages in military and economic power—as we recently witnessed in the debate within the UN Security Council over a second resolution authorizing the use of force to enforce UN resolutions and disarm the Iraqi regime.

The strategy offers little guidance as to which is the preferred arrangement and when each approach should be used. It also begs the question of what damage will be done to existing multilateral organizations such as NATO if they are routinely bypassed, as NATO was in the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the United Nations was in the war against Iraq. Members of the group pointed out that our European allies played a minimal part in the military campaign in Afghanistan, despite their first-ever invocation of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which stipulates that an attack on one member is an attack on all.

A related critique of the version of global primacy espoused by the Bush NSS was the heavy focus on *reacting to threats*, as opposed to *creating new structures and acting on opportunities for positive change*. According to one participant, “the US must take a binocular view of the future”—reacting to existing threats but also preventing and containing future threats through the construction of a new international order. “It’s not just about avoiding bad outcomes, it’s also about building better outcomes.” The threat environment should be considered in the context of where the nation is trying to go: the United States would ideally like a high degree of economic autonomy and would prefer to remain the military and technology leader. This participant, though critical of the Bush approach,

agreed with these broad goals of the Bush NSS in which the United States would maintain its dominance in various areas indefinitely. However, it must be done in a way that is truly "sustainable" in the long term. To make a new order sustainable, the United States must ask the basic question, "What's wrong with the United Nations?" The answer: the core consensus among Great Powers that established the organization has broken down, "it has been watered and beaten down." According to this participant, "All states are not created equal, so how do you differentiate them in a way that is sustainable?" The question of end states is very important, and in reaching these goals the United States cannot have it all. Thus far, the United States has been unwilling to make sustainable political tradeoffs at the international level.

At its most basic level, the question can be reformulated: Is the administration right in adopting a vision of maximum flexibility? Will an ad hoc approach based on "coalitions of the willing" be superior to the institutionalization of new norms? Or would institutionalization (the construction of revamped international organizations based on a new Great Power consensus) instead be superior, since it would allow the United States to face crises such as failed states as recurrent problems rather than treating them as completely new, "first-time, each instance" cases on an ad hoc basis?

Economic Costs. In the view of many task force members, the United States has always relied on economic might as well as its military power, latent or real, to ensure its security. Both the US international position and the welfare of its own citizens are founded on its position within the global economy. The US economic posture is and will remain central to US power and global security, and therefore the US government's economic strategy should be integrated at the level of the National Security Council. US leaders can no longer afford to relegate US economic strategy to "low politics."

Unfortunately, very few people in government understand how domestic resource strategy plays into economic statecraft. The true integration of economic and military statecraft, of shaping economic strategy to buttress US national security, is not happening at the moment. Several task force members believed that despite the language in the Bush NSS about the importance of liberal economics as the basis of a stable, self-sustaining global and domestic order, the real focus of the administration has been on maintaining and using military might. The contradiction between strategic statements and policy realities illuminates several large costs and contradictions:

- Economic statecraft: If the United States is willing to take unilateral approaches, the economics of this approach matter because our current situation is one of "coalitions of the bribed and coerced." If this is the way of the future, it is a "mercenary situation" and will be a major drain on the treasury (the Iraq war alone may cost the United States more than $100 billion). This reliance on ad hoc coalitions could in turn undermine US strategic primacy.

- While the economic policy is one of "openness," the concrete connections of the economic strategy to the military side of the equation have *not* been coordinated within the US government. The case of China illustrates this point. Is China a future Great Power competitor or a strategic partner in the new global order?

...the concrete connections of the economic strategy to the military side of the equation have not been coordinated within the US government.

- The "positive-sum" aspects of globalization are in fact susceptible to the "zero-sum" mentality of hard geopolitics, an issue that the foreign policy debate in Washington has skirted. Military or traditional strategic concerns do have economic consequences.

- Nation-building: This administration has disdained it from the beginning, but the realities of the war on terror have changed the US operating environment. The United States cannot afford to let its promises go unfulfilled in Afghanistan or Iraq.

- Sanctions: US leaders are talking about using them on North Korea and there will be more of this type of coercive instrument in the future. This, in turn, affects the functioning of both the US economy and the trading practices of other major states.

- There are two "economic wildcards": the possibility of future wars of preemption (North Korea, Syria, Iran) and the possible use of the economic instrument against the United States by states that become disenfranchised politically from the prevailing global order. For instance, the hostile use of economic power in an areas such as trade by the European Union could "make life very unpleasant" for the United States.

Moral Costs: Military Programs, "Bad Regimes," and Regime Change

Some analysts were pessimistic about the current trends in the "revolution in military affairs," arguing that the high-tech path the United States is following, when mixed with military doctrine, will have extremely negative consequences on the US image. According to one participant, "transforming the military makes many things come down the pipe that when

they are used are going to have a huge impact on how the world sees the United States," including directed energy weapons, space weapons, and so on. There are real dollars behind these emerging systems. "We discount the effects of these weapons [on US diplomacy and international image] at our peril.... Shock and awe will be transformed into disgust and horror." Chairman Korb agreed that there may not be a purposeful connection between what the US military does and the overall US grand strategy, because the military's actions will simply create a future reality that may not be in accordance with the overall strategy and policy goals.

Another task force member noted that, "We tend to operate from an assumption of our great 'benign-ness.' But much of the world doesn't regard us as benign, and many of our doctrines are aimed at other countries and are meant to be threatening." Our strategies indirectly menace more than half of the countries in the system. Kosovo in this sense was a quite shocking spectacle for the rest of the world— "we can do what we say we will do." (When this participant was in India immediately following the war in Kosovo, many Indian analysts and political commentators told him that Kosovo was a primary rationale for creating a credible Indian nuclear option). So the sense of threat that the United States purposely intends to convey in its military capabilities and doctrine may create a tremendous amount of ill will toward the United States.

The questions are: Is this an issue that matters? Can we do anything about it? There are no options for nations to balance against the United States except the nuclear option—it is the only neutralizer other countries have. However, according to one participant, it is not traditional balancing but rather *strategies of resistance to affect the United States on specific issues* that matter. One pertinent example: the United States wanted Rolf Ekeus, and instead had to accept Hans Blix, as the head of the most recent United Nations' WMD inspection team in Iraq. There are also small but meaningful efforts to delegitimize US power and policy by occasional antihegemonic alliances. Example: Russian Foreign Policy Official Primakov's antihegemonic tours to Dehli and Beijing. However, the Bush administration believes that this "friction on the margin" does not matter as much as first-order issues such as getting rid of Saddam.

In response, a pro-Bush task force member noted that India is in fact "swinging in our favor." The lesson for India of Gulf War I (in 1991) was "get nukes"; the lesson of Kosovo 1999 was "thank god we have nukes"; now the feeling in India is that American hegemony might not be so bad. So there is no need to be overly pessimistic about the consequences of US power.

Others believed that the Bush NSS "is really bad history," and its reliance on "bad history" would in fact undermine the strategy's effectiveness in the long term. In particular, the historical arguments of the Bush NSS rely on the assumption that "rogue states" can only be dealt with through preemption and preventive war, a practice that could undermine the moral and political authority of the United States on the world scene.

The underlying premise of the new directions being taken (preventive and preemptive military force) is that the rogue state threat is qualitatively different from the Cold War era, thereby mandating a radically new response that discards traditional deterrence and containment as policy solutions. The threat is thought to be "urgent" because of this level of desperation of the "bad guys," i.e., the leaders and regimes of these rogue actors are thought to be so desperate and insecure that they are not deterrable. But is this era so different from the previous? Rogue states have not "emerged" recently; rather these proliferation problems have been developing for decades, even as far back as the 1970s. This calls into question the notion that traditional deterrence, particularly against established states, is dead.

By targeting states such as Iran or North Korea with regime change, is the United States in danger of making these populations hostile for the next 100 years?

This charge of "bad history" and potential negative moral consequences of a preemptive strategy was in turn linked to the past realities of US responses to Stalinist Russia and Mao's China, especially during the Chinese Cultural Revolution. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, US decision makers in fact considered preventive war or preemptive strikes as serious policy options toward the growing Soviet nuclear threat, and even more serious arguments were made within the Lyndon Johnson administration in the 1960s in regard to the rise of China as a new nuclear power. However, these extreme policy options were discarded in favor of both deterrence and containment, which worked (though more slowly). The Soviet Union eventually collapsed; China is now a leading trading partner, is liberalizing economically, and is cooperating with us in limited ways on security issues as well.

As voiced by one participant, "Mao's China—*there* was a rogue state. And we made peace with it, which suggests anything is possible. Also, surely if we look back now, war with the USSR would have been totally unnecessary in the long run.... There is quite a difference between the disappearance of the USSR peacefully and nuclear strikes on it in the 1950s, which would have resulted in destruction of an entire country, deaths of millions of Russians, and an implacable foe for all foreseeable time." By targeting states such as Iran or North Korea with regime change, is the United States in danger of making these populations hostile for the next 100 years?

Furthermore, this participant argued, "The US obsession with the irrationality of the enemy leads to the danger of trapping the United States in the first steps of a path straight to 'regime-icide,' which is not really thought out or may be impossible in many instances." Where coercive diplomacy and threats are likely to fail, and the failure of coercive diplomacy will probably lead to war, would it not be wiser to refrain from public arguments about how the regimes in question cannot be deterred? Can US global primacy be based on a diplomatic strategy of constant threats of offensive attack toward enemies or potential enemies?

The Scope of the Concept "National Security" and the Role of Nontraditional and Transnational Threats

Will a strategy of military primacy provide more security for individual US citizens in an age of transnational terror, failing states, and competition for scarce resources among impoverished societies in the developing world? Should the United States adopt a broader definition of security that encompasses environmental and health threats experienced in other regions? Should US strategy be concerned with domestic governance issues and weak economies in other sovereign states or with transnational crime, the illicit arms trade, money laundering, drugs, and so on? In short, should the United States be concerned with both *intranational* and *transnational* trends that could present a major strategic security threat several years down the road?

Examples of these transnational and intranational trends include global warming; environmental destruction and deforestation; the AIDS pandemic; water shortages and other resource conflicts that cross borders; corrupt, inefficient, and repressive domestic institutions; illicit trade; and increasing "youth bulges" and unemployment in underdeveloped countries. Many task force members stressed that these separate trends can coalesce to present a specific regional or even global threat to US interests and security. For instance, the growing problem of chronically unemployed youth in underdeveloped countries feeds into the development of transnational terror groups or other disaffected groups with anti-US agendas. Also, weak or corrupt governments and chronically underdeveloped societies have already created havens for groups that make their money selling and transporting illicit drugs and arms, which in turn is intimately connected to the funding and training of transnational terror groups. However, there was no majority consensus on whether, and how, these nontraditional security concerns should be incorporated into an overarching security strategy.

It is the convergence of trends such as disease, poverty, lack of opportunity, and conflict over scarce resources that lead to an eventual strategic threat to US territory and citizens.

In general, there were three broad views on this issue. The traditional viewpoint was that "national security" meant military security and a focus on traditional strategic threats, such as rogue states with WMD (and the transnational terror groups which might be allied with rogues). The idea of "conflict prevention" did not really apply to this view of national security if, by "prevention," one means that the United States should expend major energies and money on preventing threats from emerging by trying to reverse negative global trends such as AIDS, failing states, resource conflicts over water, and the growth of a "global dispossessed" who do not benefit from economic globalization. Rather, "prevention" according to this school means preventing an eventual attack on the United States once an "intent to do harm" has already emerged in the form of a hostile state or transnational group. According to one of the task force members supporting this view, "If everything becomes national security, the definition loses all value."

A directly opposing view was that general demographic, environmental, social, economic, and resource trends *were* important enough to warrant preventive action by the United States as part of an overall national security strategy. However, the important focal point for policy action is in their convergence rather than in fighting each factor in isolation. It is the convergence of trends such as disease, poverty, lack of opportunity, and conflict over scarce resources that lead to an eventual strategic threat to US territory and citizens.

Finally, a third view attempted to meld these viewpoints together by focusing on the convergence of broadly negative trends within specific rogue states or failing states. This view attempted to lend concreteness to the broad demographic, social, economic, and ideological trends that could lead to a strategic threat but are hard to combat practically with specific policy options. Historically, the United States *did* in fact make this connection by "shoring up important states and preventing instability during the Cold War" on a regional basis. According to one task force member, the United States did undertake "nation-building," with the primary criteria for action being that key states could destabilize entire regions if internal crises or other pressures created a regime with hostile intent toward its neighbors and the United States. In the opinion of many task force members, Pakistan represents just such a state, given its large population, large and highly advanced military, struggling economy, lack of democracy, lack of strong and healthy economic and political institutions, lack of legitimate state identity, absence of an independent judiciary, high rate of unemployment among youth, low control over outlying areas

dominated by tribes or religious extremists, and possession of nuclear and missile arsenals.

Also connected to the question of transnational versus traditional threats was the Bush administration's relative lack of focus on various forms of restricting and securing the ready supply of nuclear materials to all states and groups—as opposed to the primary focus of the NSS on rogue regimes. One participant stressed that in the current policy environment, there has been a notable absence of attention on alternatives to traditional arms control and disarmament such as Cooperative Threat Reduction, Nunn-Lugar programs with the former Soviet states, and other similar initiatives. Currently, such initiatives seem to fall under the category of "nice to have, but not necessary."

Another task force member expressed outright incredulity and exasperation with the inability of the United States (under both Clinton and Bush) to take meaningful steps toward controlling the supply of fissile material. In his view, the one measure that could do the most to stem proliferation dangers and prevent emerging nuclear threats is to focus on the obvious, available "chokepoint": existing supplies of fissile material around the globe, especially in the former Soviet Union (FSU) states. FSU nuclear stockpiles amount to about "100 million bombs' worth of fissile material (for primitive bombs)." In his view, the whole nuclear nonproliferation regime (including the NPT) is built around the notion of controlling technological chokepoints through regulation of fissile materials. And for the past dozen years, the United States and other leading powers have put this same regime in danger by producing "tons of the stuff" and failing to "buy out the supplies of Russia for $20 billion and moving it all to the Oakridge facility for safe storage." Experts and officials first identified this threat back in 1991, and "if someone had told me back then that over a decade later 62 percent of the former Soviet Union fissile material would still be lying around unsecured, I would have been incredulous." Yet the problem remains, is still a huge risk, and "if there is a rupture in the Russian containment system, this spells the end of the NPT regime." As argued by this task force member, "The world is awash with the stuff and there is a market. There is no greater threat to the US and to world security. If we experience a failure, we will spend hundreds of billions of dollars to deal with it. This should be priority number one."

In sum: arguments over the necessity of expanding the definition of *national security* implicitly depended on each task force member's assumptions about the *nature of the current proliferation threat*, or as put by the

Bush NSS, "the crossroads of radicalism and technology." If one assumes that transnational actors are simply extensions of rogue states and that the rogue regimes in question are led by irrational leaders who will readily turn the materials over to terrorists, then the Bush approach is the only one feasible. If, instead, one assumes that the primary actor is still the nation-state—but that leaders of "bad states" are still rational actors—and there is no meaningful connection between transnational terrorism or states, then this leads one toward traditional, balance-of-power, realpolitik-oriented solutions such as containment and deterrence. Finally, if one believes that there is no connection between states and transnational terrorists, and the *real* threat is from the transnational terrorists (who are undeterrable), then this leads one toward the "Senator Lugar view of nonproliferation," namely, Cooperative Threat Reduction on a bilateral basis to keep loose fissile material out of the hands of small groups.

For many US decision makers, it is a case of "right makes might"....

The Necessity and Feasibility of Spreading Liberal Democracy

There is a strong notion in the Bush NSS and other presidential statements that the Cold War was a test between disparate value systems and that the United States emerged from this crucible of bipolar competition utterly victorious. The Bush NSS states clearly that the US-espoused values of free market economies and liberal democracy were proven to be universally applicable by the outcome of the Cold War. Based on this conclusion, the Bush NSS implies that international competition itself can be entirely ended if the "proven" principles of free market economics and liberal democracy are applied to nations around the globe. But several task force members believed that competition in the international system is inevitable and legitimate in global politics and that attempts to dramatically transform the international system to be more in line with US political, cultural, and moral values would ultimately fail—or if successful, would be prohibitively expensive and take extremely long to achieve, possibly undermining US strength in the process.

For many US decision makers, it is a case of "right makes might"—adherence to a liberal economic and democratic model not only provides the power of example to other nations but also builds national power and wealth. The US system showed during the Cold War that freedom of opportunity for individuals was a positive goal and that technological innovation under free markets is more likely because of individual creativity (which in the military sense allows for the creation of more powerful, more accurate weapons).

Meanwhile, the problem of unconsolidated states in the developing world is now reaching its peak in the form of failed and failing states, a trend

that could give rise to further catastrophic terrorism at the global level. Bush has advocated the spread of democracy and free markets as the solution to this problem over the long term. The basic argument is that repressive regimes and nonperforming economies can indirectly feed into transnational terrorism, while an open economy that is supported by institutions and backed by enforceable rules tends to increase the welfare of most citizens.

Why is democratization seen as the solution? There are several assumptions widely held in Washington about the democratic peace: democracies are less likely to fight wars; human rights are more likely respected; democracies will favor free markets and integrate themselves better into the globalized economic order; and all other political alternatives have been discredited.

However, task force members identified several problems with these assumptions:

- What about the election of radically anti-US groups?

- It might be too expensive a task for the United States to transform entire regions.

- It might be seen as hypocritical unless the United States works equally to transform all regions, or all countries within a specific region. Currently, the US strategy in the war on terror is to rely on Pakistan and various Central Asian states rather than strongly criticizing those regimes for repressive, corrupt, and inefficient domestic practices.

- Democratization may not bring about real reform, but only superficial change (elections rather than creation of strong, enduring institutions such as an independent judiciary).

- Unresolved ethnic, ideological, religious, and nationalist divisions between and within states may be translated into interstate war if democratic elections are put in place without accounting for local conditions. Historically in Europe (such as during the 19th century), democratic change allowed nationalism to flourish and made European foreign policies more bellicose, not less.

Furthermore, many task force members believed there was some contradiction between economic strategy and the goal of democracy promotion. There are an increasing number of illiberal democracies—ones in which there is a surface veneer of free elections and political parties, but the

operating reality is one of weak or corrupt judicial and economic institutions. For the US economic strategy of "openness" to work as assumed, there is a requirement for strong liberal institutions (bond markets, stock exchanges, securities commissions, and an independent judiciary); however, the Russian example shows how premature democratization can actually engender further corruption and weakening of these very institutions. Thus there may be a need to have economic freedom before political freedom in the developmental sequence.

A more realistic goal…might be to consistently support the liberalization of polities and economies where reform is already starting to occur indigenously….

In the end, the United States is not concerned just with elections, but with "liberal constitutionalism"—that is, the creation of domestic institutions that enshrine core liberal values such as freedom of speech and rule of law. This type of domestic transformation can lead to better integration of societies into the global economy, which would then lead to a domestic distribution of gains where everyone is better off.

But while the United Nations has some well-developed procedures to construct a new election process, the move to liberal constitutionalism is a decades-long effort that requires the transformation of elite values as well as political institutions. Does the United States have the patience to commit to this kind of transformation project? The complexity of the task raises questions of affordability and commitment across presidential administrations, especially since it could mean "nation-building" in many failed or failing states across the globe.

A more realistic goal, in the view of many task force members, might be to avidly and *consistently* support the liberalization of polities and economies where reform is already starting to occur indigenously—through economic aid, preferential trade agreements, aid for education and health programs, advice for constructing liberal political institutions, and general diplomatic support. But some pointed out that to implement this goal, the United States would have to put less emphasis on "stability" in the domestic governance of key developing countries that the United States relies upon in the international fight against terrorism. Instead, the United States would have to allow for domestic uncertainty and change even if this means that some developing states will refuse to be fully supportive of US efforts. This cautionary note was connected to specific examples such as Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states. Rather than depending on governments that are completely predictable, the United States might have to put more emphasis on supporting positive changes in domestic governance over long stretches of time. As argued by one analyst, "Stability is not static: a stable government will have to be able to adapt to changing circumstances."

Whatever the methods used, a majority agreed that US national security in the 21st century mandates a new emphasis on the question of domestic governance in developing societies. US security will be more easily guaranteed in a world that includes some elements of democracy or "liberal constitutionalism" across multiple regions, in particular, greater respect for human rights and the creation of new opportunities for domestic participants to be incorporated in dialogues with their own governments (rather than facing the choices of demonstrations, jail, or exile). Ideally, institutions should be created that are regarded as legitimate by a majority of the population.

The Future of Arms Control and Disarmament

Is it reasonable or possible to draw a credible moral distinction between those states that *should* be allowed to have nuclear and other WMD and those who *should not*? Or, in other words, are the weapons themselves to be uniformly banned or are they to be pursued by "good guys" to deter or preempt the "bad guys"? Is arms control a competitive exercise meant to give relative advantage to one party over another or is it a cooperative exercise that makes security a "collective good" by constraining the actions of all nations equally? And if some states are allowed to have WMD and ballistic missiles while others are not, then who judges the legitimacy of the various national security concerns that can lead to WMD acquisition? For instance, who defines whether Israeli nuclear weapons, or Indian or Pakistani, are more or less legitimate than North Korean or Iranian? Should arms control agreements assign equal duties, responsibilities, and constraints on all parties to agreements, or should arms control be *purposely selective* in assigning rights, duties, and constraints on weaponry?

According to one task force member who was generally supportive of the "Bush Doctrine," there are four essential, enduring aspects of arms control:

- It is a competitive undertaking: You are dealing with an adversary or potential adversary, and in a sense you are there to disarm them and not yourself. The idea is to improve your security situation vis-à-vis the other and come out relatively better in security terms—a situation that is actually beneficial for those nations supportive of a legitimate international order, because US interests overlap with the interests of other responsible countries. If political decision makers do not accept the process as inherently competitive from the outset, "then arms control will be so detached that it will inevitably get offtrack." It will be a utopian enterprise and will fail. If the United States adopts the view that it does not have to "enter the fray" and compete with nations who wish to

challenge the emerging global order, it will "fritter away the sources of its power." In the end, the United States must be willing to get its hands dirty and enter the fray. An "in-your-face" arms control policy is actually more humble than standing above other countries in an abstracted, idealized cooperative multilateral process, because this would demonstrate that the United States is recognizing its practical duties and responsibilities as the world's global power.

- Quite frequently and appropriately, arms control can be a tool for confrontation, as was the case with UN resolutions toward Iraq.

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- Technological progress is inevitable in the weapons field; the idea that the international community can stop or eliminate whole categories of weaponry is illusory and impossible (or even if it was possible, it would be detrimental to the United States). Quantitative arms control is usually well grounded, whereas qualitative arms control "can get you into a lot of trouble."

- The most difficult issue to deal with: There are moral distinctions between states in the context of arms development. Simply put, nuclear weapons in the hands of the United States, Israel, or France is not the same as nuclear weapons in the hands of North Korea or Iran.

In regard to "moral distinctions," according to this second task force member, there are minimum requirements that a state has to meet in order to be considered a legitimate partner in arms control:

- It must have a representative government and not simply be exploitative of its population.

- It must be a "responsible international player," which in practical terms means it "can't fight above its weight" through imposing unreasonable and unrealistic demands. The state must have "good ends in mind" such as peace and stability.

- Finally, there might be a "just war" equivalent to questions of raising armies and disarmament—i.e., in addition to existing "just war" principles and codes of conduct on the fighting of wars, the United States and its democratic allies might enunciate a new code about what constitutes legitimate, reasonable, and moral forms of national armament, defense policies, and national approaches to arms control.

However, others believed that a key difficulty is how to address the inevitable international perception that a practice of dividing states into legitimate and illegitimate actors is a fundamentally immoral position in and of itself because it discards the long-held belief that arms control is good for all of humankind and that the United States, like any other country, should be subjected to it. What kind of incentive would other countries have to buy into a competitive view of arms control that favors only the United States? It is the nature of arms control that those agreements with the greatest chance of endurance are those in which the major parties feel they all have something to gain—that the agreement is part of an ongoing relationship involving mutual constraints and policy gains. If arms control is by its very nature a compromise relationship based on equal rights and duties, then the more competitive vision of arms control proffered by some neoconservatives would have little chance of success.

Ultimately, the task force was split between those believing in a competitive view of arms control and disarmament—in which friends and foes are clearly defined and treated differently—and a view of arms control and disarmament that espoused mutually beneficial, "positive-sum" agreements between equal sovereign states.

Conventional Weapons Proliferation

As argued by one task force member, "We ignore conventional weapons proliferation at our peril." While most of the discussion on arms control and disarmament focused squarely on WMD and missiles, a vocal minority of the task force argued for a more encompassing definition that integrates conventional weapons into arms control efforts, including both "heavy" systems such as tanks and fighter planes and "light weapons" such as small arms that kill hundreds of thousands of people annually. Massive destruction will not necessarily come from ballistic missiles as carriers of WMD—for instance, antiaircraft weapons could bring down commercial airliners. In general, greater and greater destructive capacity is going to be available to smaller and smaller groups of people in the future, both with conventional arms and WMD.

According to this minority viewpoint, conventional weapons proliferation should receive new emphasis because:

- "This is the stuff of day-to-day conflict." Since World War II, 99.9 percent of casualties have been caused by conventional weapons, approximately 25 to 40 million casualties in all. Small arms and light weapons have received

increasing attention by the scholarly and nongovernmental community since the end of the Cold War due to "the pernicious interaction between weapons and underdevelopment" in large parts of the developing world.

- These arms are the weapons of choice for ethnic militias, insurgents, warlords, brigands, and other nonstate actors who threaten stability and precipitate state collapse in areas of the world where terrorists can find a safe haven.

- The most probable terrorist threats will continue to come from conventional weapons rather than WMD—for example, antiaircraft missiles.

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- Conventional proliferation interacts with questions of the US defense industrial base and defense relationships/cooperation with US allies. How should the needs of keeping the industrial base intact be balanced against the dangers of a relatively unrestrained arms sale policy? How do the dangers of proliferation impact technology-sharing with allies in key regions?

- Conventional proliferation may endanger the Bush administration's search for indefinite global preeminence. According to a Defense Science Board Report on Globalization and National Security, there are a few key conventional technologies that could be exploited to leverage gaps and exploit weaknesses in US weaponry to undermine US military dominance.

Unfortunately, there is nothing in the conventional weapons area that remotely approaches the treaty regimes, institutions, and procedures set in place during the last three decades for WMD, such as the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions or the NPT. As problematic as these latter regimes are, they are "light years ahead" of the policy discourse and institutional commitments associated with the conventional weapons proliferation problem. It is very hard to come to any consensus on conventional weapons—there is no agreement domestically or internationally on the nature and severity of the threat or the optimal response. This is symbolized in the chronic inability of the US government to reinvigorate and redefine the Export Administration Act—what one participant called a "decade of failure." Meanwhile, the United States has become interested in security assistance again—including new arms supply relationships with India and Pakistan, both of which are locked in a tense and hostile relationship that could erupt into major war at any time. This said, the Bush administration has an "arms trade policy review" in operation, but there is very little publicly said about it. It does not seem to be based upon multilateral agreement, cooperation, or strategic restraint.