The US Grand Strategy
Session 3
January 17, 2003
Meeting Notes (pdf 35 KB)—Summarized by Michael Kraig, Ph.D.
Brad Roberts, Researcher, Institute for Defense Analysis
Anatol Lieven, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
What is the role of the individual in mounting threats toward the United States? Is there really a current or potential connection between "rogue states" and terrorists? Is the future WMD terrorist threat to the United States based on this connection, or is it based on individuals and small groups completely independent of states (for instance, using materials leaked from ex-Soviet states)? With what implications for US strategy?
In preventing future terrorist attacks as well as buildups to interstate wars in key regions, what are the policy alternatives to the preventive use of military force, if any? Which nonmilitary, preventive options should the United States adopt to complement the use (or threat of use) of force?
Can and should the United States "reset" the international system to run by new rules and norms that better reflect US interests and values? Is it in the US interest to expand the zone of liberal democracy on a global basis as a means of transforming the international system? And does this strategy automatically undermine a reliance on traditional notions of sovereignty and "one nation, one vote," as defined in the UN Charter?
What does it mean to expand the zone of liberal democracy, especially in troubled regions such as the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia? What are the preferred methods for supporting democratic transitions in such regions? Do democratic reformers in other societies want or need US help? In what ways?
Is the rise of a near-peer competitor or hostile ideology inevitable, or do US strategies and actions play a large role in the evolution of such trends? Will the institution of permanent military dominance by the West actually perform the dual role of (1) dissuading states from competing along military lines and (2) convincing states in the midst of the transition process (most notably middle powers like China, Russia, and India) to forgo competitive ideologies that would create a need for military capabilities?