Engaging Today's Global Citizens

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Interview With Andrew Semmel

Nuclear weapons, proliferation, and energy have been intertwined since the beginning of the nuclear age, and since 1970 have been formally connected through the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But today, for various reasons, the NPT is facing a crisis of legitimacy—and the sole multilateral instrument for defining our global nuclear future is in danger.

Andrew Semmel is deputy assistant secretary for Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy and Negotiations for the US State Department. Stanley Foundation program officer and senior radio producer Kristin McHugh spoke with Semmel at the Stanley Foundation's 41st annual United Nations of the Next Decade Conference in June 2006.

This text has been professionally transcribed; however, for timely distribution, it has not been edited or proofread against the tape.

Kristin McHugh: What is the state of the nuclear world today, 60 years after the US used the first atomic bomb?

Andrew Semmel: Well, we can be grateful that the atomic bomb and nuclear weapons have not been used since then. There were some scary moments when there was contemplation on the use of nuclear weapons since then. But I think we're all grateful that that did not take place.

That doesn't mean that they won't take place in the future. So, therefore, we have to be very vigilant to ensure that the nuclear know-how, the nuclear materials, to say nothing of the nuclear weapons, do not get into the wrong hands, whether they be the wrong hands of states or nonstate actors, which we generally refer to as terrorists.

So, 60 years later—since the mid-1940s—we've built a number of international infrastructures, things like the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and a whole series of other cooperative arrangements to control exports and manage exports and supplies and so forth.

Whether this is sufficient remains a good question. We continue to look at the international system relative to nuclear proliferation questions, try to see where there are gaps, and then try to plug those gaps as best we can. Not unilaterally, but in collaboration with other countries.

Kristin McHugh: Now you mentioned the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT, as we shorthand it. The US is a signatory and some would argue that it's on the verge of collapse. And others would argue that it's actually done its job because there are less than a dozen countries that have nuclear weapons capability. And there was this fear after World War II that there would be dozens upon dozens. Has the NPT lived up to its original intentions?

Andrew Semmel: Depends on who you ask. As you say, you framed it correctly, I think. Generally, I think there were expectations that in the absence of enforcement mechanisms to ensure that countries comply with their treaty obligations that you would see a very rapid growth in the number of countries with either nuclear weapons capability walking right up to the line or nuclear weapons.

I think we've all seen various quotes from President Kennedy and others on that. What's happened is you've had a number of countries that have developed advanced nuclear technologies and capabilities, but not decided for one reason or another to actually go one step further, two steps further to actually develop weapons.

And you could count perhaps more than three dozen countries in that category. I think for a variety of reasons that's never happened. I think on balance there have been a number of countries that have really gone up to the line and actually stepped across the line, now step back, and those are the countries like South Africa, to some extent Brazil and Argentina.

Three countries in the former Soviet Union that gave up all its nuclear weapons. Colonel Kadaffi made a decision in late 2003 to give up his aspirations for nuclear weapons and actually all weapons of mass destruction. So there's some hope out there that countries will see their interests lie in areas other than the development of these weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

On balance, I would simply say that the NPT has had as many successes, but it has to constantly—not only it, but we have to constantly—adjust to changing realities to ensure that countries do not break out and develop nuclear weapons capabilities. And that requires the vigilance of all the countries and all these institutions that have been built up over the years.

Kristin McHugh: The United States and Russia recently updated the cooperative threat reduction agreement, which allows for billions of US dollars to flow to Russia to reduce the Soviet era nuclear stockpile. Of course, the goal of this program is to keep nuclear technology and material out of the hands of terrorists. But the program has been embroiled in controversy since it started in the early '90s. Why should the US invest billions of dollars in dismantling the Soviet stockpile?

Andrew Semmel: Well, you're right. We've invested literally billions of dollars, maybe ten billions of dollars since the inception of this program. And since the Kananaskis G8 Summit of 2002, we've pledged another $10 billion in that period of time for ten years for this purpose and related purposes.

We do it because when the Soviet Union decomposed, '89, '90, we've learned, literally with the help of the then Russians and others, that they needed help. They didn't know—they didn't have very secure facilities. In fact, they didn't even know and have very good inventories of what they had, where it was, how it was protected, and so forth.

So the fear was that somehow or another these materials, these weapons, this know-how would somehow get into the wrong hands, whether it be with the other state actors or terrorists or so forth and so on. So, the decision was made in the United States in those early 1990s eventuated in what we call the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.

The Nunn-Lugar Legislation was the spearhead of that. And we've continued that ever since. It's not been easy necessarily in the United States. I should point out that this is not just a US program.

There are other countries who have pledged a considerable amount of resources. Nothing approaching what we've done in this program because they are beginning to realize, and they have realized, that the threat of proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is not just a bilateral issue between the United States and Russia now.

But it's an international issue that all, everybody, has to chip in in one way or another with their knowledge, their technology, their resources, and so forth. So there's a collective interest in really a nonproliferation, I think, that has really motivated this program. Now whether or not we're doing enough, whether we're doing the right things is, of course, a question we can always ask. But we think we're on the right track on this.

Kristin McHugh: Now, outside of that agreement and the NPT, there are a number of new counterproliferation enforcement efforts including the Proliferation Security Initiative and the global partnership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Are these efforts really all that effective?

Andrew Semmel: Well, it remains to be seen. I think they are. In the case of trying to secure facilities, let's say in the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, basically, you have to have some kind of a structure. And the best way to secure facilities and to assure that they don't get into the wrong hands or the wrong people who might use them for malevolent purposes is to secure them at their source.

If that doesn't work, then you secure them at the border. If that doesn't work, then you secure them en route to some other place, whether it's to the United States or other friendly countries, so that you want to be able to develop some kind of holistic approach to nonproliferation.

And one of the elements of that is the Proliferation Security Initiative, PSI. It's not an organization. It's basically a set of countries, around 80 right now, who subscribe to the set of principles, come together, do exercises periodically, exchange information, improve intelligence exchanges, and so forth.

So that if there is some evidence that some weapon of mass destruction or some materials associated with that has somehow or another left a country, left a port or crossed a border, and there's really no other way in which to detect it, the point is we want to start intervening. We want to be much more proactive. And the Proliferation Security Initiative allows us to do that under existing domestic and international law. And I think that's been a critical part of this initiative.

So if the first part of the infrastructure—if you will, the global infrastructure on nonproliferation—doesn't work protecting at the source or within the country, then you have to start thinking about protecting en route. The remainder of that part, of course, is our own homeland security here. Once, if something were to get into the United States, we'd prevent it from crossing our borders through a variety of programs that we have here.

So integral to that whole arrangement, of course, are these counterproliferation efforts that you alluded to.

Kristin McHugh: Is it too early to know whether or not they should be expanded or that we should encourage expansion of these programs?

Andrew Semmel: See, one of the benefits of something like the Proliferation of Security Initiative is that hopefully it will, one, create a deterrent. That is to say a country or a group, nonstate actor, wants to move something, it knows that there are programs out there that might detect it or might stop it en route. So they may give pause for that. It may diminish the number of efforts to move illicit materials and so forth illegally.

And it also means that you have to start channeling into smaller and smaller ways in which to move that material. So, that enhances our ability to detect it and to grab it and to stop it from happening. Yeah, we hope that more countries would want to subscribe to this. And we're trying our best effort to enlist other countries.

Kristin McHugh: The run-up to the conflict in Iraq really was dominated by Western concerns. Not just US concerns, but Western concerns that Iraq had restarted its nuclear program. To date, though, we know that no evidence has surfaced.

While the premise for the current war will be debated for many, many years, what does the situation in Iraq say about reliance on intelligence gathering versus on-the-ground inspections?

Andrew Semmel: Well, I think both are needed, obviously. We need on-the-ground inspections. We need inspectors with much more authority, inspectors that can go into countries on a short notice, can go to facilities on short notice, and would have much greater authority than exist right now. And there's ways in which that can be handled.

The problem with all that is you need the cooperation of the host country where ... these inspections take place. And that's always a difficulty. Countries want to protect their sovereign rights and so forth. But nonetheless, we have to keep working on that to expand the authority of these inspectors. That's one thing.

Secondly, obviously, we need more intelligence and more intelligence cooperation. We need better intelligence. You're right about the case of Iraq. There will be lots of explanations of this historically. As I recall, the Iraqis and Saddam Hussein tried his best to convince the world that he did have weapons of mass destruction, both for internal consumption as well as for bravado purposes.

And that obviously backfired on his part. He was able to convince others that, in fact, he had these weapons of mass destruction. He at least had elements of them. And it was not just the United States, of course. The British had similar kinds of intelligence, suggesting that these programs were robust and were maturing at the same time.

So we need both. We obviously need better intelligence, national means on the grounds. Inspections, I think, would complement that very nicely.

Kristin McHugh: And is the UN the institution to bring all of the world together to make those inspections better?

Andrew Semmel: The UN is part of that, yes. I think the UN, the IAEA certainly, when it comes to nuclear facilities inspections. But there are a number of others—the OPCW, which is the chemical weapons organization— [who] have their own set of inspectors, and so forth, and their own set of requirements as well.

So, but the UN is a good place to start in trying to at least establish a kind of a norm where countries would be far more transparent about these programs, require you be far more transparent than they already are.

Kristin McHugh: Western concerns have now shifted to Iran. Now Iran seems to be sending us mixed signals. Even today they're still sending mixed signals. They say that they have the right to develop nuclear energy for energy purposes. But at the same time, they have threatened to quit the NPT. What needs to happen to resolve the current standoff with Iran?

Andrew Semmel: Well, I agree that Iran has the right. I think it's enshrined in the NPT that all countries have the sort of inalienable right to develop a nuclear energy program so long as it's in conformity with the rest of the obligations. And clearly, in the case of Iran, it has not been. I mean, that's not the position just of the US, it's the position that the International Atomic Energy Agency has taken, that they were not in compliance with their obligations.

So what needs to be done? Hopefully the strategy that's been unfolding over the last two years, first of all, to engage very actively in dialogue with the three European countries and Iran. And now with the US proposing to join that dialogue as well as a package of incentives that are now waiting for some response from part of the Iranian authorities.

We're trying to pursue every diplomatic angle that we possibly can because this is the best way of solving this problem, short of use of coercion. And so we're still optimistic that through diplomacy that we'll be able to come up with some kind of solution. But really, the ball right now, as we talk, is in the Iranian court. We're waiting for them to respond to this new initiative.

I should add one more thing, one more element to this. And that is that in our judgment the Iranians will only come around to meet its obligations on the NPT only because there has been a lot of international pressure put on them. If you were to look over the last two, two and a half years, the extent the Iranians have complied with their obligation is not because they've been a willing participant to do that.

It's because there's been international pressures. International pressures now combined with a set of incentives, hopefully that will help them turn the corner on this issue. And we're hopeful that that will take place. If it doesn't take place, then the Iranians have to know that there might be consequences which we have not spelled out obviously.

Kristin McHugh: Where does North Korea fit into all of this? We know that North Korea is not a member of the NPT. But they're one of the original axis of evil countries and they do have nuclear capabilities. So where do they fit in the global picture?

Andrew Semmel: North Korea's been a real difficult issue to deal with. Clearly, we've had several rounds of the six-party talks. And it was very promising last September when ... the six parties agreed on a set of steps to take on the North Korean nuclear program, including the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, with a number of incentives for them in terms of providing energy in the follow-on and even in some kind of security assurances to the North.

That broke down immediately within 24 hours, if I recall. There were different interpretations on what was agreed to. North Korea is critical on this and until those talks get back on the table, it seems to me that we're at a critical empass. Now, if the North Koreans do, in fact, test this presumed three-stage missile that does have intercontinental range, I think this will change the whole complexion of the relationship dramatically.

I don't think the countries in the region—South Korea, Japan, China, and to a lesser extent, Russia and other regional countries—and of course the United States are going to have to, I think, to begin the strategy of trying to simply sit down and talk this issue out. Where that will lead, I don't know. But I think it will ratchet up the level of action on the part of all countries in the region as well as the United States.

But you're absolutely right. North Korea, along with Iran, present really the most two intractable issues that we have right now insofar as nuclear proliferation is concerned.

Kristin McHugh: The US recently signed a nuclear deal with India. And India is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And critics argue that this deal really actually undermines the Global Non-Proliferation Pact and really sends the wrong message to states like Iran and North Korea.

Andrew Semmel: Well, I don't know whether it sends the wrong message. I think India has a very good record in terms of its own nonproliferation policies and practices over the years. I think that is indisputable. I think India has in the past year strengthened its export control laws.

I don't think India can be compared with Iran and North Koreans on the record of its own practices and its own contentions. Obviously, if the Iranians or North Koreans want to use this proposed deal—proposed initiative between the United States and India—they can do so.

I would just say this. While it's an initiative on the part of both the United States and India, it has to jump through many hoops. And one of which, it has to get acceptance of the international community of nuclear suppliers—it's called the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

And so this will be an issue which countries will have to judge whether or not they have confidence in India in terms of continuing with this good practice of its nonproliferation policies of the past. You don't have that record for Iran and DPRK. So I think there's a big chasm between India on the one hand and these other two outliers on the other.

Kristin McHugh: And this agreement also requires congressional approval?

Andrew Semmel: It will require congressional modification of existing statutes, yes.

Kristin McHugh: Given what we know now about Iraq, given the situation that we just talked about with India and this agreement that some people don't like, someone argued that the US really has a major credibility problem when it comes to trying to negotiate with states like Iran and North Korea in dealing with the nuclear proliferation concerns that we have as a country. Do we have a credibility problem?

Andrew Semmel: Depends on who you ask. I don't think there's any country that has done more to strengthen the nonproliferation regime than the United States. That is a disputable fact in the eyes of many other countries. But clearly, if you look at the record, we've done more. Obviously, we're in a position to do more given who we are and our own interests and so forth.

[The] credibility problem I think comes mostly in the perception of other countries—that we have not engaged in nuclear disarmament at a pace that others would like us to see and would like all nuclear weapon states to proceed in accordance with Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We think that argument is bogus. If you were to look at the trend lines from let's say ten, fifteen years ago and chart that out, you would see a very accelerated decline in the number of nuclear weapons, nuclear warheads that the United States has.

And while this doesn't satisfy other countries, it does satisfy many once we make the case that we have, in fact, engaged in disarmament. We could always argue, I suppose, that the pace ought to be faster. But clearly the facts are clear that we rely far less today on nuclear weapons for our national security strategy than we did in the past. I mean, that's significant. That's part of our US doctrine.

Kristin McHugh: President Bush has called for an expansion of a nuclear energy program as a way to ease US dependence on oil. But how can the US and other countries balance the increased reliance on nuclear energy while at the same time decreasing proliferation threats?

Andrew Semmel: It's a tough order, quite frankly. I think it's going to require a considerable amount of cost, considerable amount of ingenuity. The development of new technologies for nuclear technologies will have to be developed that is going to be proliferation resistant, that is going to be cleaner in terms of environmentally more friendly, and that is going to be better in handling the issue of nuclear waste as the end product, and so forth.

Now, having said that, it's going to be costly. The US can't do it. It will have to be a consortium of countries that will have to combine their resources, their talents, experiences on this, on ways to develop these new technologies. And there are already a number of proposals that are on the board that are being debated right now. But it will take years for this, I think, to unfold.

But I think there is a serious commitment given the energy crisis that we face now. There is a serious commitment that this is a national goal that we're pursuing. Other countries with advanced nuclear technologies have been enlisted to offer their contributions and their collaboration on this, but it will take some time for this to unfold and for us to get out from underneath these total dependence on the fossil fuels.

Kristin McHugh: What do you believe the global nuclear community will look like in 20 to 30 years?

Andrew Semmel: Very good question. I wish I had the answer to that. We, critically, we can always say this. It sounds like a cliché, but we're at a critical juncture right now. And if Iran were to develop these nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons capabilities and this would be a signal, let's say, for other countries in the region—whether they be the Saudis or the Egyptians, Syrians, perhaps others—that if the Iranians can do this, why shouldn't we?

And you then begin to get this out-of-control spiral of nuclear weapons states, and so forth. I think we're likely to see in that one juncture, in that one direction in which the world might go, a far more dangerous world in which only by arithmetic the prospects of the use, whether intended or accidental use, of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials is going to increase.

The other juncture is one for the world community through the United Nations, through the various institutions and other means that are available to us to take the tough stance on compliance and enforcement, to toughen and strengthen international institutions that are relevant here. Maybe to develop new institutions to be able to provide for countries that want to have nuclear energy that are otherwise deprived of access to fossil fuels, and so forth.

To be able to develop a system whereby they will have some assured supply at market prices of nuclear fuel for their peaceful power reactors. We have to work on that as well. There's a number of programs that are being explored in that area as well.

If we go down that road, I think the world would be not the dangerous world I just described on the other route. But we're clearly at a fork in the road, and it's up to all the institutions that I just mentioned as well as the individual countries to be able to choose which route they want to take. We're hopeful that it's gonna be the second route. So if it is the second route, I think our children, children's children are gonna be much safer than they would otherwise be.