Engaging Today's Global Citizens

US-India Nuclear Agreement

Last week, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh met in New Delhi to further strengthen bilateral ties between the world's most powerful democracy and the world's most populated democracy, building on Singh's visit to Washington last July. Under the joint statements signed by the heads of these two states, the United States and India will "transform the relationship between their countries and establish a global partnership...[a]s leaders of nations committed to the values of human freedom, democracy and the rule of law."

The statements lay out an ambitious set of goals and objectives that define this new partnership, including stronger economic ties, cooperative efforts on energy and the environment, collaboration on science and technology innovation, increasing efforts on global safety and security, and a renewed emphasis on democracy promotion and meeting international challenges.

President Bush is right to pay attention to the growing influence of India, both in the region and globally. Factoids about India abound, but some are worth repeating. India's population is more than one billion and is second only to China—which it is predicted to overtake by 2050. And India's economy is growing at a rapid pace, bringing increased energy demands along with it.

India's historic regional ties with countries such as Iran and China have also been a cause of considerable concern and debate. The relationship with Iran has played out during deliberations on Iran's nuclear programs within the International Atomic Energy Agency and at the United Nations; with China, in an ongoing political discussion of whether India will act as some kind of strategic counterweight to China's rise as a political, military, and economic power. And finally, India is one of only three countries in the world known to have a nuclear weapons arsenal and yet not bound by any international obligations on it—along with its neighbor, Pakistan, with whom it has already fought three wars in their brief 50 years of existence.

Partnership or Legal Framework?

Under these circumstances, by far the most provocative initiative envisioned in the statements between the two leaders is President Bush's desire to begin full nuclear energy cooperation with India, including providing nuclear fuel to Indian civilian nuclear reactors. Nuclear sharing of any sort between countries bound by the restrictions of the international framework—embodied in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), of which the United States was principal author and proponent—and those such as India who choose not to abide by the global convention is not simply discouraged, it's flatly illegal.

Indeed, without the restrictions of the NPT, the global community would have no right—and no standing—with which to question the actions of other states that we are concerned about; namely, Iran and North Korea. The question, then, is whether the United States should break with the international legal framework in the name of a strategic goal (e.g., improved relations with a rising power such as India) and whether this will improve or erode US and global security.

The Supporters

Proponents of the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative correctly point out that there is currently no restriction, no oversight, and no obligation on Indian nuclear programs, and that this new initiative will bring India into the international community in a way that no other vehicle—including the NPT—has been able to achieve. Indeed, there is near-universal consensus that India is unlikely to ever give up its nuclear weapons and join the NPT as a nonnuclear weapons state—at least in the current regional and international environment. And so, proponents of the deal argue, why not get from them what we can? The text of last week's joint statement paints a rosy picture of the specific responsibilities that India will shoulder as part of this agreement. India will:

• Identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs, and file a declaration with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

• Voluntarily place its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

• Sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol.

• Continue a moratorium on nuclear testing.

• Work for the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

• Support nonproliferation efforts.

The Critics

However, there is less to this than meets the eye when the specifics are examined more closely. While 184 countries have pledged not to pursue nuclear weapons and the IAEA monitors the nuclear facilities of more than 140 countries, India will only put 14 of its 22 reactors under international supervision based on this agreement. The remaining eight—and notably its breeder reactor program, which is capable of producing large amounts of nuclear material—will not be under any control at all. Indeed Prime Minister Singh has already stated that India will not scale back its nuclear weapons program in the slightest because of this new cooperation, saying to Indian lawmakers, "India will not be constrained in any way" by the agreement.

In this light, it is difficult to ascertain what tangible benefits will come from separating its civilian and military programs, placing only its civilian programs under IAEA safeguards, or adhering to an Additional Protocol—which will only expand inspections within those 14 reactors. While continuing a testing moratorium is certainly better than the alternative, India has tested its nuclear weapons as recently as 1998, and it is not at all clear how India will benefit by testing again, regardless of the nuclear cooperation deal.

As far as the FMCT is concerned, the major roadblock in its negotiation and implementation has been the United States' opposition. And without a dramatic shift in US attitudes toward an FMCT, Indian support has limited value. Nearly every country around the globe has announced its intentions to assist with nonproliferation efforts, particularly regarding "rogue" and nonstate actors. Notably, none of them have received special exemptions from international nonproliferation law for their assistance.

Breaking the Standard

There are other problems as well. For over 35 years, more than 180 countries have abided by international law and chosen not to seek nuclear programs of their own. With the United States actively promoting exemptions and the carving out of special cases, it is likely that some of these will soon follow suit and pursue their own security needs. Likewise, if another nuclear weapons country (Russia) wants to make a bilateral exception for another nonnuclear weapons country (Iran), it will be nearly impossible to garner international support against such an initiative once the standard has been broken.

Ironically, it is possible that India itself may be the first one to pursue such a separate course. Also this week, Prime Minister Singh has announced that India will judge its interactions with Iran independently, separate from this nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States, stating that "in dealing with the issue, we will pay due attention to our relationship with Iran, the need to maintain peace and stability in the Gulf region, and safeguarding our own security." The more scrutiny the US-Indian nuclear cooperation agreement receives, the less tangible its benefits begin to look.

Next Steps

Regardless of President Bush and Prime Minister Singh's intentions, however, the nuclear cooperation agreement is far from settled. Congress must take up the issue and pass legislation carving out an exception to the 35-year-old Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. Such legislation has already been questioned from powerful senior legislators of both parties and in both chambers of Congress. The debate could become more contentious later this year. Congress will have the opportunity to amend President Bush's request and to raise the bar on requirements for India, if it so chooses. And the initiative must also gain the approval of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the 45-nation international body that oversees and regulates the international transfer of nuclear materials. International skepticism has likewise been considerable.

A strategic partnership with India and improved nonproliferation efforts are laudable and important goals for the United States. However, one must not be sacrificed for the sake of the other. And while the United States seeks creative pathways and new security relationships, it must carefully weigh the reactions and consequences of its behavior. In this regard, as the world seeks better mechanisms to thwart proliferation, the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement should give the United States and the international community pause.

—Matt Martin